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Abstract
What would it mean to permit lack to become a productive place? What, indeed, would it mean to think place
– so often feminized in the carnophallogocentric order – as active? Lack, in these terms, could be constitutive
rather than a mere marker of absence. I propose that the place of bees in the symbolics of species could yield
answers to these and related questions. Insects are often understood and conceived as communicators –
through pheromones for instance. But in the very gesture that recognizes their communication, one finds the
refusal of consciousness behind this communicative apparatus. If bees are said to lack consciousness, bees
nonetheless matter. But what place will bees have as they face extinction? Amidst much else, bees are a
medium of pollination for human agriculture. In that sense, bees are a matrix for the very sustenance of the
human species: a place for humans. In China, honeybee death has led to the need for human workers to
pollinate crops by hand (Goulson). The possible extinction of the honeybee is a potentially devastating effect
of the anthropocene. We are tied to bees as long as we are tied to crops and agriculture, but this is not the sole
reason to care about bees.
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How, then, she had asked herself, did one know one thing or another thing 
about people, sealed as they were? Only like a bee, drawn by some 
sweetness or sharpness in the air intangible to touch or taste, one haunted 
the dome-shaped hive, ranged the wastes of the air over the countries of the 
world alone, and then haunted the hives with their murmurs and their 
stirrings; the hives, which were people (Woolf, 55). 
— Virginia Woolf 
 
What would it mean to permit lack to become a productive place?  What, indeed, would it 
mean to think place – so often feminized in the carnophallogocentric order – as active? Lack, in 
these terms, could be constitutive rather than a mere marker of absence. I propose that the place 
of bees in the symbolics of species could yield answers to these and related questions. Insects are 
often understood and conceived as communicators – through pheromones for instance. But in 
the very gesture that recognizes their communication, one finds the refusal of consciousness 
behind this communicative apparatus.  If bees are said to lack consciousness, bees nonetheless 
matter. But what place will bees have as they face extinction? Amidst much else, bees are a 
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medium of pollination for human agriculture. In that sense, bees are a matrix for the very 
sustenance of the human species: a place for humans. In China, honeybee death has led to the 
need for human workers to pollinate crops by hand (Goulson). The possible extinction of the 
honeybee is a potentially devastating effect of the anthropocene. We are tied to bees as long as 
we are tied to crops and agriculture, but this is not the sole reason to care about bees. 
Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of the speciesist asininity of a binary distinction of human and 
animal – the abyssal rupture of l’animot – is something most scholars in the field of Human-
Animal studies are aware of. But the implications of this deconstruction of the animot are 
sometimes less well understood than they are cited (Derrida, 30). Here, I parse Derrida’s 
deconstruction of the human animal binary, particularly as it takes issue with Jacques Lacan; this 
critique is not insignificantly concerned with the place of bees. I do so not only to reveal the 
steps in Derrida’s argument, but also the gendered limits: the lack within its very thought of 
lack. It is for this reason I turn finally to Luce Irigaray in order to rethink lack as such and the 
way it is imputed to the honeybee. 
As I have suggested, the honeybee is one critter at the heart of Derrida’s deconstruction of 
Lacan. Lacan writes: 
It is now generally admitted that when the bee returns to the hive from its honey-
gathering it indicates to its companions by two sorts of dance the existence of nectar and 
its relative distance, near or far, from the hive. The second type of dance is the most 
remarkable, for the plane in which the bee traces the figure-of-eight curve – which is 
why it has been called the ‘‘wagging dance,’’ – and the frequency of the figures 
executed within a given time, designate, on the one hand, exactly the direction to be 
followed, determined in relation to the inclination of the sun (on which bees are able to 
orient themselves in all weathers, thanks to their sensitivity to polarized light), and, on 
the other hand, the distance, up to several miles, at which the nectar is to be found. And 
the other bees respond to this message by setting off immediately for the place thus 
designated (quoted in Derrida 123.) 
Apis Nearctica, the honeybees and their relatives can dance and in dancing, communicate to 
their hive fellows the relative distance and trajectory that can be followed to find sources of 
water and pollen — a process which James L. Gould famously called honey bee ‘recruitment’ 
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(Gould). Karl Von Frisch is credited with having ‘showed that bees indicate the distance and 
direction of food sources by two kinds of dances: a round and a tail-waggle dance.’ In doing so, 
he posited these twin dances as a mode of communication, or code, or language – and the 
distinction between these three will be crucial to those various humans it upsets. Since the 
debate about bee communication took place between Von Frisch – with his dance hypothesis –  
and Adrian Wenner – with his reductionist insistence on pheromone signalling – bees have come 
to appear epistemically fragile creatures, as well as literally endangered in varying geopolitical 
sites and spaces. While Wenner queried the complexity of honeybee dance by recourse to a 
reduction of the bee to a pheromonal automaton, Von Frisch’s ideas have prevailed  
among ethologists.1  
Drawing from the revelations of Von Frisch, then, Lacan opens a space for the bee in the 
thought of signs and signification. At least, one would have thought so, but Lacan continues, 
sceptically: 
But is it necessarily a language? We can say that it is distinguished from language 
precisely by the fixed correlation of its signs to the reality that they signify. For in a 
language signs take on their value from their relations to each other in the lexical 
distribution of semantemes as much as in the positional, or even flectional, use of 
morphemes, in sharp contrast to the fixity of the coding used by bees. And the diversity 
of human languages [langues] takes on its full value from this enlightening discovery 
(quoted in Derrida, 123–4). 
For Lacan, human languages in their diversity are to be the human exceptionalist ground for the 
dismissal of other diverse communicative apparatuses – including bee or human dances. Their 
phylogenetic distinctness seems to me no good reason to dismiss the Bee dance in its complexity 
or affective vivacity. Indeed, Lacan does not do so. Yet he nonetheless denies bee 
                                                       
 
 
1 Tania Munz has discussed this debate in rigorous historical detail (Munz).  
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communication the status of a language in spite of such complexity. For this reason, Derrida 
detects a bad conscience and a Cartesian reductionist human exceptionalism to boot: 
Lacan is so precise and firm when it comes to accrediting the old yet modernized topos 
of the bee that he seems, if I might say so, not to have a clear conscience. I detect an 
unavowed anxiety behind the authority of this new, yet so old, old discourse concerning 
the bee. . . . When bees appear to ‘‘respond’’ to a ‘‘message,’’ they do not respond but 
react; they merely obey a fixed program, whereas the human subject responds to the 
other, to the question from or of the other (quoted in Derrida, 123). 
As Derrida shows, for Lacan, the bee is hermetically sealed from a true response. It is supposed, 
rather, to be a machine that merely reacts to stimuli. 
It is therefore precisely the question of the radicality of alterity that will form the ground of 
Derrida’s debate with Lacan over lack, in which bees become a drone in a poststructuralist hive 
of debate. As Derrida notes, for Lacan: ‘When bees appear to ‘respond’ to a ‘message,’ they do 
not respond but react; they merely obey a fixed program, whereas the human subject responds 
to the other, to the question from or of the other’ (qtd. in Derrida, 123). As Derrida will 
further note, throwing up his arms: ‘This discourse is quite literally Cartesian.’ For Derrida, 
instead, it is not the Cartesian relation between the subject and consciousness that matters, but 
the fact of the relation’s redundancy when the question of a code is evoked. To signify 
subjectivity through a code – whether human language or honeybee dance – is to give up the 
Cartesian centrality of the thinking ‘I’ as what is essential to subjectivity. It becomes not only 
ethically but also epistemologically problematic to undertake to distinguish the human from the 
nonhuman, as such. As Cary Wolfe has argued, two consequences follow from the error of the 
animot: the first is that differences in degree tend to be confused with differences in kind; the 
second, which paradoxically follows from the first, arises insofar as this difference of kind 
occasionally permits us to recognize nonhuman animals as worthy ethical agents when they 
resemble the kind that we are (Wolfe 10). 
So the metacommunicative structure is inaugurated by the passaging from pretense to a 
‘feigning’ of ‘feigning.’ This doubled feigning becomes for Lacan, in turn, the basis for the 
ontological rift discursively maintained by Lacan as an inheritor of the founding 
carnophallogocentric presuppositions of Cartesian abyssal rupture. For Lacan, the animal cannot 
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‘feign feigning,’ it cannot pretend to pretend – this is the first binary distinction that will 
exclude prey animals and predators alike. Lacan nevertheless admits that animals are capable of 
certain kinds of feints and pretences: 
[d]eployed in an imaginary capture, the feint is integrated into the play of approach and 
retreat that constituted the first dance  . . .  [A]nimals show that they are capable of such 
behaviour when they are being hunted down; they manage to throw their pursuers off 
the scent by briefly going in one direction as a lure and then changing direction  . . .  But 
an animal does not feign feigning [feindre de feindre]. It does not make tracks whose 
deceptiveness lies in getting them to be taken as false, when in fact they are true — that 
is tracks that indicate the right trail (Lacan 293). 
What is most vital is not only that Lacan sets up an abyssal rupture between the human and the 
nonhuman at the level of animot – though he certainly does that and Derrida will not fail to 
point it out. Rather, what is most significant about the mode of animot installed by Lacan and 
deconstructed here, at the level of the logic of the sign, is that it assumes a fundamental 
difference between consciousness of metacommunication and metacommunication itself.  
Derrida describes the undecidability of logocentric language, with its binaries, as itself opening 
onto a lack at the centre of the supposed stability of the Cogito: 
Undecidability comes to trouble the opposition, which is so decisive for Lacan, between 
leaving tracks [tracer] and covering one’s tracks [effacer ses traces]. The animal can 
trace, inscribe, or leave a track or trace but, Lacan adds, it does not ‘‘cover up its 
tracks, which would be tantamount to making itself the subject of the signifier.’’  . . . 
(and this is why so long ago I substituted the concept of trace for that of signifier), the 
structure of the trace presupposes that to trace amounts to erasing a trace (always 
present-absent) (Derrida 135. Emphasis added). 
The signifier is always already undecidable in its sincerity and, as such, there is no distinction 
between feigning and feigning feigning. For Derrida, all signification is trace. One consequence 
of this is that the possibility of feigning feigning is emergent from the very first pretence (or, 
indeed, from the most faithfully performed act, always at risk of recognition as pretence or 
indeed, pretence of pretence). Every sign inaugurates the possibility of its reversal; this is where 
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metacommunicative possibilities arise as such. When ‘I’ am given in signification, ‘I’ is given to 
the vicissitudes of what Derrida will variously call a general play of trace and iterability. It is not 
that some beings are the subject of the signifier and others are mere automatons because, for 
Derrida, signs are always already trace and marks of meaning can always be feints, or, indeed, 
feints of feints. What is crucial is that abandoning the Cartesian proposition in favor of the 
inscription of the subject in the trace of code (linguistic or otherwise) means that one cannot 
discriminate between the relative complexity of codes and communicative devices. 
While Derrida takes issue with Lacan on the question of signifier and trace, nonetheless each 
continues to maintain the basic post-structuralist proposition that the subject is inscribed in 
language. Once one has granted such a proposition, then the specificity of the subject of 
language (as opposed to the code of the automaton) remains in play whether the levels of tracing 
and erasure are many or few. This is the case whether one expresses the proposition through 
Lacan’s phrase ‘man’s desire is the Other’s desire’ [le désir de l’homme est le désir de l’Autre] 
or through Derrida’s notion that ‘there is nothing outside the text,’ or as it perhaps should 
better be rendered, ‘there is no outside-text’ [il n'y a pas de hors-texte] (Lacan 158–9). For 
Derrida, once agreement has been reached on certain crucial propositions of post-structuralism 
about the alien-ness of the subject to the langue that inscribes it, to insist on the distinction 
between making and erasing a trace inevitably results in a reduction ad absurdum. 
The problem that Derrida rightly sees in Lacan’s discourse is that it produces a difference 
between human and animal on the basis of a lack: 
if ‘human knowledge has greater autonomy than animal knowledge in relation to the 
field of force of desire,’ and if ‘the human order is distinguished from nature,’ it is, 
paradoxically, because of an imperfection, because of an originary lack or defect [défaut] 
in man, who has, in sum, received speech and technics only inasmuch as he lacks 
something (Derrida 122). 
Derrida deconstructs Lacan by showing that he relies on a notion of lack [manque] and defect 
[défaut] in ‘man,’ even as such tropes of absence are also the basis for his diagnostic exclusion of 
‘the’ animal from any possible resemblance to langues.  
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The point, implicit in Derrida’s discussion is that there is an affinity between human and bee at 
the level of lack: each is to some degree estranged from conscious participation in the respective 
codes within which they are inscribed. The inscription of the subject in a code inevitably implies 
a lack of conscious participation in that code. It is not that humans lack consciousness or that 
bees can be shown to possess it. The point is that even the conscious subject lacks a relation to 
the code in which they are inscribed. It is also, therefore something shared between every being 
that operates in relation to some communicative code or other: bee or ‘man,’ or ‘human,’ or 
‘woman.’ Unless a Cartesian reduction is the basis of one’s discursive grounding of human-
animal difference, then the recognition that the languages we speak, speak us is something we 
share at the level of affinity (if, perhaps, not complexity) with every form of signifying life. It is 
here that bees will become a sticking point between the two post-structuralists. 
Bees matter and they lack no less than we do. Derrida gives us a great deal more reason than 
Lacan to care about the suffering and potential disappearance of bees, no doubt. But 
nonetheless, Derrida’s thought operates not by showing what we might be said to share with 
bees, except in so far as what we share is the fundamental lack at the center of language. In this 
way, what Derrida is concerned about in Lacan is true of Derrida himself: namely that there is a 
constitutive lack at the center of the subject of the signifier. Derrida agrees with Lacan (more or 
less) on this point; the difference is that Derrida would not foreclose the sharedness that this lack 
might proffer between the human and what it calls the animot.  
Since humans rely on bee pollination practices to grow and eat food, humans are dependent on 
bees. Bees then – their sociality, their practices of pollination informed by this gregarity – can be 
seen as a matrix for humans. Bee social life is the womb of human rebirth. As Luce Irigaray 
argues, matrices are subject to the aporia of lack: ‘If the matrix is extendable, it can figure as the 
place of place’ (Irigaray 34. Original emphasis).  How can a place, have a place? Therein goes the 
aporia that Aristotle poses in Physics IV and which Irigaray takes up for feminist thought. 
Irigaray develops the concealed gendering of this logic: ‘[a]s for woman, she is place’ (Irigaray 
35). For Irigaray, the phallocentric rendering of woman as a place for man means that the 
presence and agency of woman is limited by her positioning as place. The queen of an Apis 
Nearctica hive is not dissimilar, the sovereign figure of the reproduction of the hive as a site  
of life.  
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Yet, if the human (gendered ‘man’ by Lacan) is a site of lack: other to himself, then man is as 
constitutively marked by absence as the bee. Further, Irigaray restores to place and therefore to 
woman, an active status denied her by the patriarchal order. Woman as place is more agential 
than the thing that man is, in his lack.2 ‘Place,’ Irigaray develops it, ‘is thus not the thing but that 
which permits the thing to be insofar as the thing can exist in and outside place’ (Irigaray 38). 
Here, if place is not a thing, it nonetheless actively ‘permits’ the formation of all things, all 
matter. Place is the positive attribute of lack. Perhaps consciousness of metacommunication – 
something lacking in ‘man’ and in bees – is productive of affective connection. Place, rather than 
carnophallogocentric consciousness – constituting the thing – permits affect to be transferred 
between human and nonhuman beings; the dance of the bee does so as much as the chatter  
of ‘man.’ 
Just as ‘man’ as the signifier of the gendered human is constitutively lacking, as Derrida argues, 
so Irigaray revalues the active role as matrix to ‘woman’ (as signifier of the human gendered 
female). That woman as place can envelop and command and that ‘man’ as a figure of Cartesian 
mastery can actually be shown to lack precisely what is constitutive of his mastery leads Irigaray 
to reimagine reciprocity: 
What is, in the masculine, the relation between these two vessels? Is he able to receive 
woman in the reverse of herself? In the mourning for herself? Can he beckon to her and 
welcome her into himself once he has separated himself from her? Since he must 
separate himself from her in order to be able to be her place (Irigaray 39–40). 
Man too, as place, can beckon and welcome woman, always the site of welcoming, hospitality, 
place. If then, the bee is a figure of equivalence, I would propose that we think those 
phylogenetically distinct non-humans as places that permit us to be and in permitting us, in this 
way, demand our reciprocity. Bees are a place for human food production. They are, then, 
                                                       
 
 
2 By ‘woman,’ I do not mean living embodied, cysgendered female subjects. Rather, I follow Irigaray in 
using ‘woman’ as the signifier assigned to that subject in the semiotic economy of phallogocentric (and 
indeed carnophallogocentric) thought. 
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thought of as a place for man — penetrative, exploitative, carnophallogocentric. We must, I 
argue, feminize the human and permit ‘man’ to be rearticulated as an open receptacle — a place 
for place.  
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